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Abstract: We examine the relationship between the incidence of workplace
deviance (on-the-job crime) and the state of the economy. A worker’s probability
of future employment depends on whether she has been deviant as well as on
the availability of jobs. Using a two period model we show that the net impact
on deviant behavior to changes in unemployment can go either way depending
upon the nature of the equilibrium. Two kinds of equilibria are possible. In one,
a non-deviant’s probability of being employed increases as expected market
conditions improve which lowers the incentive to be a deviant. In contrast, in
the other kind of equilibrium, the deviant’s probability of being employed
increases when market conditions improve which increases the incentive to be
a deviant. In either case, there is a setup cost to deviant behavior and the
attractiveness of incurring that increases with an increase in expected probabil-
ity of future employment which unambiguously increases the incentive to be
deviant. In the first kind of equilibrium, the two effects counteract each other,
while in the second they reinforce each other. Finally, we characterize condi-
tions under which an increase in optimism, i.e. a reduction in the probability of
facing a recession unambiguously increases deviant behavior.
Keywords: crime, recession, dynamic deterrence
JEL Classification: D84, E32, J63, K42
1 Introduction
In this paper we examine whether there is any relationship between workplace
deviance (on-the-job crime) and the state of the economy i.e. does such behavior
increase or decrease with the anticipation of a recession? This “deviant beha-
vior” could be in the form of shirking at work, stealing from the firm, sabotage,
harassing other workers etc. Deviant behavior has consequences for a firm’s
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profitability. Further, while a deviant employee enjoys current benefits from
such behavior, it affects her future employment prospects if caught. Currently,
there is no consensus in the literature about whether deviant behavior in the
workplace increases or decreases with the state of the economy, nor is there a
cogent theoretical framework to analyze such behavior.1 Popular newspaper
accounts suggest that the recent recession may have increased employee theft.
For instance an article by Needleman (2008) in the Wall Street Journal suggests
employee theft has increased in the recession. In the UK, KPMG’s fraud barom-
eter (KPMG 2010) for January 2010 shows employee fraud in book keeping and
accounting on the rise in the recent recession. However, one of the few scholarly
studies on employee theft (Rickman and Witt 2007) shows strong evidence of
employee theft decreasing as unemployment increased in the UK for the period
1999–2000. This suggests that the answer to the question may well depend on
the nature or severity of recession and there could well be opposing forces at
work in a recession. Further, (as we elaborate below) shirking which is another
measure of workplace deviance also does not appear to unambiguously increase
or decrease with recession. In order to provide an answer to this question, we
build a dynamic model which analyzes how the current market condition as well
as expectations about future market conditions affect the intertemporal tradeoffs
that people make in deciding how to behave in their current workplace.
We treat workplace deviance as a type of on-the-job crime committed by rational
criminal economic agents who derive benefit from their deviant behavior but incur
costly sanctions if caught. Thus, we can analyze it using the framework in Becker’s
(1968) analysis of crime, though as we discuss, the framework would need to be
extended to take into account expectations about future market conditions. To see
this, recall that in a standard Beckerian model, if people can choose between work
and crime, the impact of unemployment increases crime as it lowers the opportunity
cost of crime.2 However, when we modify the model to take account of the fact that
1 There is an introductory discussion in Cook and Zarkin (1985) on the ambiguous relationship
between crime and the business cycle. They also provide some empirical evidence that the
relationship between crime and the business cycle is counter-cyclical. However, their analysis
does not specifically deal with on-the-job crime or labor effort. There has also been some work
on the long run relationship between crime and the business cycle using U.K. time series data
e.g., Pyle and Deadman (1994) but not for on-the-job crimes.
There is also some literature using an experimental set up of sabotage in the workplace
(Harbring and Irlenbusch 2011) when relative performance is used to evaluate workers.
2 Becker’s work has been extended to examine several aspects of crime such as examining how
economic and law enforcement factors affect crime, including the possibility of multiple equili-
bria as in Sah (1991), Fender (1999), Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003) and Burdett, Lagos, and
Wright (2004). There has also been some empirical analysis of crime and unemployment (though
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people can both work and commit crime which is what we need to consider when
analyzing workplace deviance, the state of the economy plays no role in a standard
static framework. Instead, workplace deviant behavior is entirely determined by the
probability of apprehension and the severity of punishment. However, once we take
into account that being caught in deviant behavior has implications for future
employment, the state of the economy plays an important role, albeit a complex one.
To see this, we note two effects that act in opposite directions-deviant
behavior today causes lowered chances of employment tomorrow but employ-
ment prospects additionally also depend on the general state of the economy
tomorrow. Intuitively, if the general state of the economy is such that employment
prospects are bleak in the future, loss of employment may not act as much of a
deterrent and thus people would commit more on-the-job crime (including shirk-
ing) when expecting an economic downturn as the opportunity cost of such
behavior goes down with a lowered expected wage in the labor market.
However, working against that is the fact that when jobs have to be cut, managers
may fire the least productive workers, that is, workers with “bad” records may
find it harder to get jobs in a recession which makes the marginal value of
abstaining from deviant behavior higher in a tight labor market. Further, indul-
ging in workplace crime may incur a setup cost and may be worth paying only if
the potential criminal has a chance to benefit from incurring this one time cost.
The direction of the net effect is thus far from clear and we identify two types of
regimes where there are different impacts of future market conditions on current
workplace behavior. Thus we identify how the state of the economy affects firm
profitability not only through well recognized channels such as the strength of
demand, wage rates etc. but also through its effect on workplace behavior.
While there are no precise estimates of workplace deviance, the empirical
evidence on labor effort and the state of the economy is mixed. Some papers find
empirical evidence that labor effort increases in a recession (e.g. Franke and Kaul
1978; Stern and Friedman 1980; Wadhwani and Wall 1991; Drago and Heywood
1992; Agell 1994). Others, such as Spitz (1993) find no such relationship. Surveys
conducted on managers give contradictory findings. Some believe that shirking
goes down during a recession while others believe that it goes up. In an interview
of 47 businesses undertaken by Bewley (1999), it was found that 42% believed
labor effort goes up during a recession, while 15% believed it goes down and 42%
believed it has no impact. The closest data we have on deviant behavior would be
data on recorded employee theft. In a study of employee theft in the UK, Rickman
and Witt (2007) find that increases in the unemployment rate decrease employee
without specific reference to on-the-job crime) such as Carmichael and Ward (2000, 2001), Doyle
and Ahmed (1999) and Han, Bandyopadhyay, and Bhattacharya (2013).
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theft. These contradictory findings on deviant behavior suggests the need to build
a theoretical framework to provide a precise answer to the question.
We consider a model where the economy can be in a good state (boom) or a
bad state (recession). Given the state of the economy, there is a probability
distribution over the future state of the economy. Further, we assume that the
prospects of employment depend on (a) the state of the economy and (b) one’s
past record. During a boom, more people are employed, so an employer may
have to employ people even with a “bad” record, while during a recession the
employer can afford to be more selective. This bad record can be in the form of
having been caught shirking or committing an on-the-job crime including sabo-
tage and harassing other employees. Formally, any kind of deviant behavior
which will lead to a “bad” history and sanctions if caught is what we call crime.
Thus while crime has benefits, it has costs in terms of sanctions if caught and a
lowered probability of future employment. Further, a career in crime has set up
costs, so a first time criminal additionally faces a one time fixed cost.
The current state and expectations about the future state are parameters in
the model and determine current and future employment. The probability of
getting a job from any state to another is however endogenously determined as
it depends on current behavior. Further, current behavior in turn determines the
crime rate in period 1, which determines the probability of employment in
period 2. We assume for simplicity that everyone is employed in a boom, and
that only a fraction of the population is employed during a recession; the
severity of the recession is measured by labor demand in a recession. A more
severe recession is associated with lower labor demand. Our results depend on
the characteristics of the equilibrium, and in particular, we find that three
possible types of regimes can exist. In one type of equilibrium (Regime 1),
only a fraction of people with an unblemished record can find jobs in a reces-
sion. Everyone else is unemployed in that case. In another type of equilibrium
(Regime 2), all people with an unblemished record find jobs in a recession as do
a fraction of currently unemployed people. Finally, in the third type of equili-
brium (Regime 3), even a fraction of workers with a bad record get jobs. We
analyze what happens when the severity of recession increases, both for small
shifts (which does not change the equilibrium regime) as well as for large shifts
(which can change the regime). Changes in expectations i.e. changes about the
probability of facing a future recession is also analyzed.
We provide an intuitive discussion of our main results. The impact of
increased severity of recession (in terms of a lowered probability of finding a
job if there is a recession tomorrow) in period 2 on the incentive to commit crime
in period 1 depends on the proportion of the workers with a bad record (which is
an endogenous variable in our model). Suppose in case of a recession tomorrow,
50 A. Bagchi and S. Bandyopadhyay
the equilibrium is regime 1 i.e., a situation where in a recession, no one with a
criminal record finds a job, but even some employed people without a criminal
record cannot find jobs. Given such an equilibrium, any worsening of the
severity of the recession (while staying in regime 1) increases the incentive to
commit crime in period 1. Since a person with a bad record is anyway not hired
in this case, therefore, any change in the severity of the recession will not have
any impact on her behavior. However, a change in the severity matters to a
person who has a good record, since such a person has a lower likelihood of
being employed in a more severe recession. Thus, an increase in the severity of a
recession reduces the incentive to maintain a good record. Consequently, the
incentive to commit crime should be higher in this case. This is similar to what is
predicted by the standard Becker model.
However, it is also possible that the anticipated equilibrium is regime 3. In
this case, all people without a criminal record get a job, but some people with a
criminal record also get a job. In this case, an increase in the severity of a
recession has an opposite effect. Since people with a good record get a job
anyway, therefore, any change in the severity of the recession does not affect
their behavior. However, a tightening of the labor market reduces the probability
of people with bad records of getting a job. This in turn lowers the incentive to
commit crime as the marginal value of staying crime free (and thus having a
clean record) increases. This goes against the standard Beckerian result as the
future value of staying crime free is higher in a tighter labor market where
employers can be more selective about who to hire. In regime 2 there is no net
impact as the changes in employment affect only the employment prospect of
the currently unemployed and not of those employed in period 1.
The setup cost always reduces the incentive to commit crime if the labor
market is expected to tighten in the future and will counteract the first effect in
regime 1 but reinforce it in regime 3. Thus, in regimes 2 and 3, the net incentive
to commit crime goes down with anticipated recession, while in regime 1 it can
go either way.
Our results differ both from the theoretical prediction in the standard Becker
(1968) model which implies that crime increases with an increase in unemploy-
ment as well as the theoretical (and empirical) prediction in Rickman and Witt
(2007) who on the contrary find that the rate of unemployment has a negative
relationship with the crime rate. Once one accounts for the future consequences
of crime and trades it off against current profitability, the relationship between
deviant behavior and the unemployment rate (or the severity of the recession)
could be positive or negative depending on the type of recession.
In the context of the recent recession, there has been some discussion about
policies that could increase confidence in the economy. This paper does not deal
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with such policies but it can rather be used to determine the impact on work-
place discipline if there is an increase in optimism about the future.3 Our model
predicts that an increase in optimism i.e. a decrease in the probability of
recession in period 2 (holding the severity of recession constant) always
increases the incentive to commit crime in period 1 as long as nearly everyone
gets a job in a boom. Thus, there is a difference in the predicted impact of a
change in the severity of the recession vs. a change in the degree of optimism.
The impact of the former can vary depending on the character of the equili-
brium, while the impact of the latter stays the same regardless of the nature of
the equilibrium provided that people with bad records gain more relative to
people without one.
We set up the model in the next section, solve for period 2 equilibrium in
Section 3, and analyze the incentive to commit crime in period 1 in Section 4.
Section 5 endogenizes the decision making process of firms and Section 6
concludes.
2 The Model
This is a two period model4 (t ¼ 1; 2Þ with two possible states s 2 H; Lf g during
each period with H representing a boom and L representing a recession or bust.
Further, the state in period 1 determines the probability of the state in period 2.
In particular, let γss0 be the probability that the state in period 2 is s
0
, given that
the state in period 1 is s. For example, if the state in period 1 is H, then the
probability of the state being H in period 2 is γHH , and the probability of the state
being L in period 2 is γHL. It follows that,
γsH þ γsL ¼ 1 for s ¼ H; Lf g:
There are a large number of potential workers in our model. We denote the
employment status of a person in period t by an indicator variable Ωt that takes
a value 1 if the person is employed in period t and takes a value of 0 otherwise.
At the end of a period, an employed person receives a wage ws if the state is s.
3 Political leaders the world over have been asked to restore business confidence so that it
begins to hire workers. For example, in the UK the Federation of Small Businesses (2011) point
out that business confidence has fallen and suggest various policies to restore confidence.
4 While the two period formulation is a simplification, it suffices for our purpose as our aim is
to study the way current crime decisions are affected by the fear of loss of future employment
prospects and adding more time periods while adding complexity should not change our
qualitative findings.
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Further, in the spirit of several models of the labor market such as Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984), we assume that wages are lower in a recession, that is wL  wH .5
We denote labor demand in state s by es. Further, we assume that
eH ¼ 1
while
0:5 < eL < 1:
Hence, by assumption, no one is unemployed during a boom, while a fraction
1 eLð Þ is unemployed during a recession.6,7 Since the focus of the paper is to
explain why the level of deviant behavior in the workplace may be non-mono-
tonically related to the severity of the recession (as opposed to explaining the
reason for business cycles), therefore, it suffices for our purpose to assume the
level of employment in each state as exogenous. However, Section 5 endo-
genizes the hiring choice of firms and in the concluding section, we argue that
the central idea of the paper would still hold if we had allowed labor demand in
period 2 to depend endogenously on the crime rate in period 1.
If employed, an individual can choose to work honestly or indulge in deviant
behavior. Throughout the analysis, we use the terms “crime” and “deviant
behavior” interchangeably. An unemployed person cannot commit crime in our
model because we consider only on-the-job crimes. In contrast, an employed
person can choose to either commit a crime or to remain innocent in each period.
We denote the set of actions for a generic employed individual by
At ¼ Ct; Itf g
where Ct denotes that the individual chose to commit a crime in period t and It
denotes a decision to remain honest in period t: If an individual commits a
crime, she derives a private benefit of B  0 while her payoff is 0 if she chooses
to be innocent. The private benefit from crime (which one may interpret as the
individual’s type) is heterogeneously distributed in the population in the interval
0;B
 
following the distribution function G Bð Þ with density function g Bð Þ.
5 The question of how to use wages or compensation contracts to deter workplace deviance is a
complex issue. Examples of early work in this topic are Eaton and White (1982, 1983), Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984), Akerlof and Yellen (1986) and Bewley (1999).
6 The rationale for the assumption that eL > 0:5 will be clear when we analyze the equilibrium.
Essentially, this ensures that there are equilibria in which some people with a deviant record in
period 1 are hired in period 2.
7 It would have made no substantial difference in the results even if we had assumed that eH
was less than 1 but greater than eL. The implications of relaxing the assumption eH ¼ 1 are
discussed in Section 4.
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An individual incurs a cost of τ > 0 in her first crime episode and a cost of 0
in subsequent episodes (which is a normalization). The cost τ can be thought of
as a set-up cost of crime. This framework has similarities with Mocan, Billups,
and Overland (2005) who allow individuals to allocate their time in the acquisi-
tion of either legal human capital or criminal human capital. As they note (see
p. 660), “individuals become more skilled criminals through learning-by-doing.”
Deutsch, Simon, and Spiegel (1990) provide empirical evidence that there is
indeed substantial learning-by-doing in criminal activity. In our model, we allow
an individual to decide whether or not to acquire the criminal human capital by
paying a one-time fee. The set-up cost can also include any emotional cost
associated with committing crime. From the second time onwards, such a set
up cost will be lower due to a lowering of the learning cost or any psychic or
emotional cost associated with committing a crime. Hence, one could have
assumed that the fixed cost associated with crime is τ1 for the first instance of
crime and τ2 for the second instance such that τ1 > τ2. Since τ2 would unneces-
sarily complicate the analysis, therefore, we assume it to be 0.
The employer imperfectly monitors actions in the workplace. Only a fraction
of deviant behavior is punished with p 2 0; 1½  being the conviction probability.
We assume that the conviction probability p is exogenous. Such an assumption
allows us to demonstrate the main result (that an increase in the severity of a
recession need not lead to an increase in workplace deviance) in the simplest
possible manner. Later on, in the concluding section, we discuss the effect of
endogenizing this variable. The monetary value of a convicted person’s punish-
ment is denoted by f . It is helpful to think of this monetized value as a fine
(perhaps in terms of withheld bonuses) though in the concluding section we
discuss what would happen if instead the penalty took the form of imprisonment.
We assume that the enforcement agency publicly releases the record of a
person. We denote the record of a person by R. The record of a person can be
“bad” if an employed person is convicted, or it can be “good” if she has either not
committed a crime or has not been caught in an act of crime and “no record” if a
person does not have an employment history. Note once again that an unemployed
person cannot be convicted in a period since we consider only on-the-job crimes.
Recall, in any period, employers hire the entire population in a boom and
only a fraction eL in a recession. Employers are profit maximizers and as we
explain below, first prefer hiring previously hired workers with a good record,
then prefer hiring previously unemployed persons and finally prefer previously
hired workers with a bad record. Therefore, in the model, the record (and
previous employment status) of a person affects her likelihood of being
employed if there is a recession in period 2. In the discussion of period 2, we
provide a rationale for this preference.
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The utility of a person in period 2 is given by
U2 A2; s2;Bð Þ ¼ Ω2 ws2 þmax B Λτ  pf ;0jt ¼ 2f g½ 
where Λ is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for the first offense and 0
otherwise. Notice that the term B Λτ  pf is the net expected benefit from
deviant behavior in period 2 while the net benefit from remaining innocent in
period 2 is 0. Notice that the utility of an unemployed person in period 2 is 0
since for this person, Ω2 ¼ 0. Similarly, the utility of an employed person in
period 1 is given by
U1 A1; s1;Bð Þ ¼ Ω1 ws1 þmax B τ  pf ;0f g½  þ E1 U2 A2; s2;Bð ÞjΩ1;A1½  ½1
where E1 U2 A2; s2ð ÞjΩ1;A1½  is the expected utility in period 2 assuming agents
take optimal actions in period 2. The optimal actions will depend on the para-
meters of the economy and on the action in period 1.
3 Analysis of Period 2
We first analyze an individual’s optimal behavior in period 2. In period 2, an
employed person commits crime for the first time if and only if expected net
benefit from crime is positive
B pf  τ  0
, B  pf þ τ ; B2 :
Similarly, an employed person commits crime for the second time in period 2 if
B  pf ; B2 :
Thus, it follows from the expressions above that B2 > B

2 i.e., the threshold for
committing crime is lower for a person who had already committed a crime
previously. This is because such a person does not have to incur the setup cost
of crime again.
In order to complete the analysis for period 2, we need to specify the firm’s
preference between hiring (i) an experienced worker with a good record, (ii) an
experienced worker with a bad record, and (iii) an inexperienced worker. We
assume that a firm prefers (i) over (iii) and (iii) over (ii). The firm’s preference
of (i) over (iii) is consistent with the observation that employers value experi-
ence because previously unemployed workers may have lost some skills due to
having been out of the job market. This is what is called the “scar of unem-
ployment” (Arulampalam 2001). As for the comparison between (iii) and (ii),
there is a tension between the higher productivity of an experienced worker
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(albeit with a bad record) and the higher incentive to indulge in deviant
behavior of a person who has already incurred the set up cost. We assume
that the latter effect outweighs the former. In any case, what matters most for
our analysis is that the firm prefers an experienced worker with a good record
over an experienced worker with a bad record and the spirit of the argument
would not change if we were to assume that the inexperienced workers are the
least preferred category.
4 Analysis of Period 1
In order to determine U1, we need to determine the value of E1 U2 A2; s2;Bð Þ½
jΩ1;A1. It follows from eq. [1] that the decision of a person to commit crime or
to remain honest in period 2 depends on her private benefit B from crime as well
as her expected cost of committing crime in period 1. Note that the expected cost
of committing crime in period 1 depends on the expected employment status in
period 2. In order to determine the expected utility of a person in period 2, we
need to first determine the expected value of Ω2 and this is done below.
Let q A1; s1ð Þ be the probability that Ω2 takes a value of 1 in period 2 (that is, it
is the probability that a worker is employed in period 2). In this model, q
depends on two factors: (i) the action of an individual in period 1 since it
stochastically affects the individual’s record R, and (ii) the state of the economy
in period 1, given by s1, because it determines the likelihood of the state of the
economy being H or L in period 2. Therefore, the utility in period 1 is given by
U1 A1; s1;Bð Þ ¼ Ω1 ws1 þmax B τ  pf ;0f g½  þ E1 U2 A2; s2;Bð ÞjΩ1;A1½ 
¼ Ω1 ws1 þmax B τ  pf ;0f g½ 
þ q A1; s1ð Þ wL þmax B Λτ  pf ;0f g½  þ γs1H wH  wLð Þ:
½2
In the right hand side of eq. [2], the first term is the payoff that a person receives
in the first period and the second and third terms capture the continuation
payoffs. In period 2, the person receives at least wL þmax B Λτ  pf ;0f gð Þ if
she is employed and an additional wage premium wH  wLð Þ if there is a boom in
period 2. The chance of being employed in period 2 is q A1; s1ð Þ and the chance of a
boom is γs1H . Hence, the sum of the second and third terms capture the continua-
tion payoff in period 2, conditional on information available in period 1.8
8 The fact that employment prospects tomorrow depends on behavior today is consistent with
the theory that it is optimal to treat repeat offenders disadvantageously (see Polinksy and
Shavell 1998).
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It follows from eq. [2] that if a person commits a crime in period 1 i.e., if
A1 ¼ C, then the benefit from the crime is B plus a lowered cost of committing
crime next period (i.e. τ won’t have to be incurred next period) while the cost
from the crime depends on τ þ pf as well as on the changed probability of
employment because of committing crime in period 1 given by q I; s1ð Þ  q C; s1ð Þ
which captures the additional benefit of being crime free.
An individual commits a crime in period 1 if her private benefit from crime is
greater than or equal to a threshold level and she does not commit a crime if her
private benefit is below that threshold level. We refer to this threshold level as
the marginal criminal type. Let ~B denote the marginal criminal type. Then the
following conditions must be satisfied: (i) the benefit from committing crime
must be equal to the cost of committing crime of the marginal criminal, (ii) the
benefit from committing crime must be less than the cost of committing crime if
the private benefit is less than the marginal criminal type, and (iii) the benefit
from committing crime must be greater than the cost of committing crime if the
private benefit is greater than the marginal criminal type. This is illustrated in
Figure 1. As shown in the diagram, the marginal criminal type ~B is indifferent
between committing a crime and remaining innocent.
We denote the cost of crime when the benefit is B, the marginal criminal is ~B
and the state is s1 by
Δs1 B; ~B
 
; τ þ pf þ q I; s1ð Þ wL þmax B τ  pf ;0f g½ 
 q C; s1ð Þ wL þmax B pf ;0f g½ :
Note that Δs1 B; ~B
 
depends on the parameters τ; p and f as well as the change in
probability of being employed in period 2 for being deviant in period 1. The right
hand side of the above expression will be explained in detail later.
Let λ ~B
 
be the proportion of the workforce (or the workers employed in
period 1) with a bad record at the beginning of period 2 given that the marginal
Figure 1: This diagram
compares the cost of
crime with its benefit
given that the type of the
marginal criminal is ~B.
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criminal type is ~B. Hence, it is given by the product of the probability of being
caught and the probability of having a benefit high enough to commit crime i.e.
λ ~B
 
;p 1 G ~B  :
Similarly, the proportion of workforce (or the workers employed in period 1) with
a good record is
1 λ ~B 
if the marginal criminal type is ~B. Let the state in period 1 be s1 where s1 ¼ H; L.
Hence, if the marginal criminal type in period 1 is ~B, then the fraction of the
population with no record is
1 es1 ;
the fraction of the population with a good record is
1 λ ~B  es1 ;




We now determine the probability of being employed in period 2.
4.1 Probability of Employment in Period 2
If there is a boom in period 2, then everyone is employed regardless of record.
However, if there is a recession in period 2, then only a fraction of the population
can gain employment and hence, in this case, a person’s record matters. Suppose
there is a recession in period 2. Then, three kinds of regimes can occur: (a) Only a
fraction of the population with a good record is employed (Regime 1), (b) all
individuals with a good record are employed and only a fraction of those with no
record are employed (Regime 2), and (c) all individuals with a good record or no
record are employed, while only a fraction of individuals with a bad record are
employed (Regime 3). Given the marginal criminal type ~B, Regime 1 occurs if
1 λ ~B  es1  eL;
i.e. the number of people not convicted in period 1 is greater than labor demand
in a recession. Hence, only a fraction of employed people without a criminal
record in period 1 are employed in period 2. Given that these are the most
preferred employees, no other category of workers is employed.
Regime 2 occurs if
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1 λ ~B  es1 þ 1 es1ð Þ  eL > 1 λ ~B  es1 ;
i.e., after employing all workers without a criminal record, only some of the
workers unemployed in period 1 (given by 1 es1Þ are employed. No convicted
person in period 1 is employed in period 2. Regime 3 occurs if
eL > 1 λ ~B
  
es1 þ 1 es1ð Þ: ½3
i.e., in this case, even some period 1 convicts are hired as labor demand exceeds
the number of people without a record as well as the number of unemployed. In
particular, when there is a boom in period 1, then Regime 1 occurs if the marginal
criminal type ~B is such that 1 λ ~B    eL, Regime 2 does not occur at all (since
there are no unemployed people in period 1 if it is a boom) and Regime 3 occurs if
eL > 1 λ ~B
  
. By definition, λ ~B
 
is a decreasing function of ~B, and hence,
1 λ ~B   is an increasing function of ~B. Therefore, when there is a boom in
period 1, then Regime 1 occurs for relatively high values of ~B and Regime 3 occurs
for relatively low values of ~B. This is depicted in the upper panel of Figure 2.
Further, when there is a recession in period 1, then Regime 1 does not occur at all
(since in regime 1 there are no people unemployed in period 1), Regime 2 occurs if
the marginal criminal type ~B is such that 1 λ ~B    2 1eL and Regime 3 occurs
if 2 1eL > 1 λ ~B
  
.9 Therefore, when there is a recession in period 1, then
Regime 2 occurs for relatively high values of ~B and Regime 3 occurs for relatively
low values of ~B. This is depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 2.
The probability of being employed in period 2 depends upon the action of
an individual in period 1, the state in period 1 and the appropriate regime in
which the equilibrium occurs in period 1. These probabilities are presented in
Table 1. We now explain these probabilities. First, consider the probability
q C;Hð Þ of being employed in period 2 if there is a boom in period 1 and an
individual commits a crime in period 1. Such an individual will have a bad
record with probability p and a good record with probability 1 pð Þ. Suppose
Regime 1 occurs, that is, during a recession only a fraction of the individuals
with a good record are employed and the others are not employed. An indivi-
dual who committed a crime in period 1 will be employed in period 2 only
when there is either a boom in period 2 or a recession in period 2 and this
individual was not convicted in period 1. In the latter case, this individual can
be employed only if she is assigned to a job from amongst the pool of workers
9 Note that 2 1eL  eL because 1 eLð Þ
2  0.
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with a good record. Conditional on a good record the probability of being
employed is given by the ratio of employment slots (eL) and the number of
people with a good record (1 λ ~B ). The probability of a boom in period 2 is
γHH and the probability of this individual being employed with a good record
Table 1: The probability of being employed in period 2 as a function of the action and state
in period 1.
q(A, s) Regime  Regime  Regime 
q(C, H) γHH þ γHL 1 pð Þ
eL
1 λ B  – 1 γHLp 1 eLλ B 
q(I, H) λHH þ γHL
eL
1 λ B  – 





q(I, L) –  
Figure 2: The upper panel shows the different regimes when there is a boom in period 1
followed by a recession in period 2. The bottom panel shows the different regimes when there
is a recession in both periods.
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during a recession is given by the joint probability of a recession (γHL) and not
being caught (1 p). Thus, the probability of employment if the state is L in
period 2 conditional on crime in period 1 is given by γHL 1 pð Þ eL1λ ~Bð Þ. Hence,
q C;Hð Þ ¼ γHH þ γHL 1 pð Þ eL1λ ~Bð Þ under Regime 1. In contrast, under Regime 3,
during a recession, only a fraction of individuals with a bad record are
unemployed while the others are all employed. If an individual commits a
crime, then the joint probability of a recession and the individual having a bad
record is γHLp. Notice that the number of “unemployment spots” is 1 eLð Þ and
these have to be rationed among the number of individuals with a bad record
given by λ ~B
 
. Hence, the probability that an individual with a bad record will
be unemployed in a recession is 1eL
λ ~Bð Þ and consequently, q C;Hð Þ ¼ 1 γHLp
1eL
λ ~Bð Þ.
Similarly, we obtain the other expressions. The probabilities are plotted as a
function of the marginal criminal type in Figure 3.
Figure 3: The upper panel shows the probability of being employed in period 2 if there is a
boom in period 1. The lower panel shows the probability of being employed in period 2 if there
is a recession in period 1.
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4.2 Equilibrium if There Is a Boom in Period 1
Suppose that there is a boom in period 1. Now consider the decision of an
employed worker in period 1 whose private benefit is B
0
. Recall that the marginal
criminal type has benefit ~B. If a person with private benefit B
0
decides to commit




¼ wH þ B0  τ  pf þ q C;Hð Þ wL þmax B pf ;0f g½  þ γHH wH  wLð Þ
where q C;Hð Þ ¼ γHH þ γHL 1 pð Þ eL1λ ~Bð Þ if the marginal criminal type ~B belongs to
Regime 1 and q C;Hð Þ ¼ 1 γHLp 1eLλ ~Bð Þ if the marginal criminal type ~B belongs to





¼ wH þ q I;Hð Þ wL þmax B τ  pf ;0f g½  þ γHH wH  wLð Þ:
where q I;Hð Þ ¼ γHH þ γHL eL1λ ~Bð Þ if the marginal criminal type belongs to Regime
1 and q I;Hð Þ ¼ 1 if the marginal criminal type belongs to Regime 3. Now
consider a worker with private benefit B
0
> ~B. Such a worker must prefer to
commit a crime instead of remaining innocent. Hence the following inequality

















; τ þ pf þ q I;Hð Þ wL þmax B0  τ  pf ;0
n oh i
 q C;Hð Þ wL þmax B0  pf ;0
n oh i
:




captures the cost of committing a
crime when a worker has a private benefit of B
0
and the marginal criminal type is
~B, given that s1 ¼ H. Similarly, if a worker has private benefit B00 < ~B, then she









Finally, if a worker has the private benefit of ~B, then she is indifferent between
committing a crime and remaining innocent. Therefore, the following equality
must hold for an employed worker with type ~B:
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~B ¼ ΔH ~B; ~B
 
; τ þ pf
þ q I;Hð Þ wL þmax ~B τ  pf ;0
 	  q C;Hð Þ wL þmax ~B pf ;0 	 ;
½4
that is, at ~B the following equality must be satisfied:
~B ΔH ~B; ~B
  ¼ 0:
In eq. [4], the term
θH ~B
 
; q I;Hð Þ wL þmax ~B τ  pf ;0
 	  q C;Hð Þ wL þmax ~B pf ;0 	 
½5
is known as the dynamic deterrence effect.10 This effect is the opportunity cost of
crime because it captures the future payoff that a worker has to sacrifice if she
commits a crime in period 1.11
We now determine the impact of a change in the labor demand eL during a
recession on the dynamic deterrence effect. This allows us to analyze the
relationship between the severity of a recession and the incentives to commit
crime. For the discussion below, it will be helpful to use a notation that captures
the marginal criminal’s utility in period 2 if she is employed in period 2 and is
paid the minimum wage of wL. Therefore, let V2 A1ð Þ be the utility of the marginal
criminal if she took an action A1 in period 1, is employed in period 2 and is paid
the minimum wage of wL. Thus,
V2 A1 ¼ Cð Þ ¼ wL þmax ~B pf ;0
 	
denotes the utility of the marginal criminal in period 2 if she is hired in period 2
but had committed a crime in period 1, while
V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ ¼ wL þmax B τ  pf ;0f g
denotes the utility of the marginal criminal in period 2 if she is hired in period 2
and if she had not committed a crime in period 1.
10 The way the term dynamic deterrence is used is similar in spirit to Imai and Krishna (2004)
i.e. “current criminal activity adversely affects future employment outcomes”. See discussion in
the concluding section for the tradeoff this implies in terms of optimal punishment.
11 Notice that in our model, an individual worker is insignificant compared to the entire
workforce; hence, each worker takes the crime rate as given and determines her optimal action.
This would not have been the case if we had considered deviant behavior by unions, such as
strikes. The reason is that unions would have the power to shift the equilibrium crime rate,
while an individual worker takes the crime rate as given.
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The expression for θH ~B
 
given above is not very convenient for our pur-
pose. Hence, we manipulate the expression in eq. [5] and obtain the following
decomposition:
θH ~B
  ¼ q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þf gV2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ
 q C;Hð Þ V2 A1 ¼ Cð Þ  V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þf g:
½6
Notice that the terms q C;Hð Þ, q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þ, V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ and
V2 A1 ¼ Cð Þ  V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ ½7
are all non-negative. To explain briefly, q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þ is the change in prob-
ability of employment conditional on an unblemished record in period 1 while
V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ
is the net utility in a single period for a person contemplating crime for the first
time. Thus, q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þf gV2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ is (proportional to) the net benefit of
staying crime free in period 1 in terms of utility obtained in period 2, i.e., it is the
increased probability of employment conditional on not committing crime multi-
plied by the utility of a person who does not commit crime in period 1. On the
other hand, by not committing crime, the worker forgoes an advantage in terms
of lowered second period utility as she has to pay an additional cost in period 2
if she commits a crime in period 2. That is captured by
q C;Hð Þ V2 A1 ¼ Cð Þ  V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þf g:
Thus the net benefit of staying crime free depends on the improved probability
of employment and the increased cost of committing crime in the second period.
4.2.1 Impact of a Decrease in the Severity of a Recession
We now consider the impact of a decrease in the severity of a recession. In our
model, this is captured by an increase in the labor demand during a recession eL






L. Consider the upper panel of Figure 2. Notice that the
boundary between the regimes is determined by the intersection of 1 λ ~B  and
eL. Therefore, if eL goes up from e0L to e
1
L, the boundary shifts to the right. Pick a
value of ~B and notice that any of three possible outcomes can occur because of
the rightward shift of the boundary between Regime 1 and Regime 3: The marginal
criminal type ~B lies (a) to the right of the boundary (in Regime 1) both for eL ¼ e0L
as well as for eL ¼ e1L, (b) to the left of the boundary (in Regime 3) both for eL ¼ e0L
as well as for eL ¼ e1L, and (c) to the right of the boundary (in Regime 1) for
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eL ¼ e0L and to the left of the boundary (in Regime 3) for eL ¼ e1L. Observe that an
increase in eL leads to a regime change only for the third case. We now analyze
how ΔH B; ~B
 
changes in response to an increase in eL.
First consider (a). In this case, the marginal criminal type ~B changes but the
equilibrium remains in Regime 1 both for eL ¼ e0L as well as for eL ¼ e1L. Suppose
a person decides to remain innocent at some level of benefit B. Then there are
two impacts on her continuation utility: (i) She has a higher probability of being
employed in period 2. (ii) Conditional on being employed, the utility of an
innocent person in period 2 is less than the utility of a criminal (that occurs
because of the set up cost of crime, given by τ).
In Regime 1, an increase in eL increases q C;Hð Þ but it increases q I;Hð Þ by
more. Hence, if we are in Regime 1 both before and after a change in eL, then an
increase in eL leads to an increase of both q C;Hð Þ and q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þ. An
increase in q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þ implies that the additional probability of being
hired in period 2 conditional on having a good record (as opposed to a bad
record) increases and this enhances (i) mentioned above. Therefore, following
eq. [6], an increase in q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þ increases the incentive to stay innocent
in period 1 by increasing dynamic deterrence. There is however a second effect
described by (ii) above that dampens dynamic deterrence. To see this, notice
that a person who remained innocent in period 1 is at a disadvantage in period 2
compared to a person who committed a crime previously. The magnitude of this
disadvantage is given by eq. [7]. An increase in eL leads to an increase in q C;Hð Þ
which is the weight on the disadvantage factor and this enhances the power of
(ii). Consequently, following eq. [6], an increase in q C;Hð Þ increases the incen-
tive to commit a crime in period 1 by decreasing dynamic deterrence.12 In
summary, in this case, the incentive to commit crime can go either way.
We now consider (b), that is the case in which the equilibrium is Regime 3
both for eL ¼ e0L as well as for eL ¼ e1L. In this case, an increase in eL increases
q C;Hð Þ and has no impact on q I;Hð Þ. As discussed above, a decrease in
q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þ decreases the incentive to remain innocent in period 1 and an
increase in q C;Hð Þ reinforces the same effect. Hence, dynamic deterrence
decreases and this decreases ΔH B; ~B
 
. Hence, the cutoff value of B for the
marginal criminal type goes down unambiguously. This implies that in this
case, a reduction in the severity of a recession leads to an increase in crime.
12 Note, we are interested in the dynamic deterrence effect or the incentive to commit crime
rather than the crime rate as changes in employment affect the total number of employed
workers so the number of people who commit crime could (for example) increase because there
are more people who can commit on the job crime if eL has increased even if the incentive to
commit crime goes down i.e. ~B goes up.
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Finally, we consider (c), that is the case in which one shifts from Regime 1
for eL ¼ e0L to Regime 3 for eL ¼ e1L. In this case, q C;Hð Þ changes from
γHH þ γHL 1 pð Þ
e0L






Observe from Figure 3 that e
0
L
1λ ~Bð Þ < 1 because e
0
L belongs to Regime 1. Further,
since e1L belongs to Regime 3, therefore,
e1L
1λ ~Bð Þ > 1 from which it follows that
1e1L
λ ~Bð Þ < 1 as well. Hence, let
e0L




  ¼ 1 1; 1 >0:






 γHH þ γHL 1 pð Þ
e0L
1 λ ~B 
( )
¼ 1 γHLp 1 1ð Þf g  γHH þ γHL 1 pð Þ 1 0ð Þf g
¼ γHL 1 pð Þ0 þ p1f g>0:
Hence, an increase in eL leads to an increase in q C;Hð Þ and this decreases the
dynamic deterrence effect. The corresponding change for q I;Hð Þ is given by
1 γHH  γHL
e0L
1 λ ~B 
¼ γHL0 >0:
Hence, the change in q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þ is given by
γHL0  γHL 1 pð Þ0 þ p1f g
¼ γHLp 0  1ð Þ:
Notice that the above expression has an ambiguous sign. If this is negative, then
the dynamic deterrence effect goes down unambiguously. However, the expres-
sion above can be positive as well in which case the net impact on dynamic
deterrence can be positive. To summarize, if e0L is such that the equilibrium is
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Regime 1 and e1L is such that the equilibrium is Regime 3, then a reduction in the
severity of the recession has an ambiguous effect on crime.
The following proposition summarizes the three cases discussed above.
Proposition 1 Suppose there is a boom in period 1. (a) If the equilibrium belongs
to regime 1 both before and after an increase in eL, the net impact on crime can go
either way. (b) If the equilibrium belongs to regime 3 both before and after an
increase in eL, then it increases the incentive to commit crime. (c) If the equilibrium
belongs to regime 1 to begin with and after an increase in eL it moves to regime 3,
then an increase in eL can cause crime to go either way.
It is also interesting to examine how Proposition 1 would change if the set-up
cost of crime τ was assumed to be 0. In order to determine the answer to this
question, first note from eq. [7] that
V2 A1 ¼ Cð Þ  V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ ¼ 0
whenever τ ¼ 0. Hence, in this case,
θH ~B
  ¼ q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þf gV2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ:
When eL increases, then V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ does not change but q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þ does.
Therefore, by applying similar reasoning as above, we obtain the following
corollary:
Corollary 1 Suppose τ ¼ 0. Also let there be a boom in period 1. (a) If the
equilibrium belongs to regime 1 both before and after an increase in eL, then it
decreases the incentive to commit crime. (b) If the equilibrium belongs to regime 3
both before and after an increase in eL, then it increases the incentive to commit
crime. (c) If the equilibrium belongs to regime 1 to begin with and after an increase
in eL it moves to regime 3, then an increase in eL can cause crime to go either way.
When τ ¼ 0, then we have a sharper prediction in case (a). Thus, when τ ¼ 0,
the impact on crime is unambiguous within a regime, but this is not the case
across regimes, because an increase in eL changes the incentive to commit crime
quite differently in cases (a) and (b). In addition, the result in (c) stays the same
even when τ ¼ 0.
4.2.2 Impact of a Differential Treatment of Workers Based upon Past Record
One possibility that has not been considered so far is that in period 2, firms may
treat workers differently depending upon their past record. Indeed, one may expect
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an employer to pay less to a worker who has a bad record in period 1, or to monitor
such a worker more stringently, or to impose a higher fine on a repeat offender.
The ultimate impact of such a policy is to reduce V2 A1 ¼ Cð Þ compared to what we
obtained in the section above. For small reductions in V2 A1 ¼ Cð Þ, we will still
have V2 A1 ¼ Cð Þ>V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ as in the sections above, and Proposition 1 continues
to hold. The interesting change occurs when V2 A1 ¼ Cð Þ<V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ. This
assumption is maintained only for the remainder of this subsection. To analyze




  ¼ q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þf gV2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ
þ q C;Hð Þ V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ  V2 A1 ¼ Cð Þf g:
We now examine how the marginal criminal type ~B changes with an increase in
eL from e0L to e
1
L. Notice that a change in eL changes only the terms
q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þð Þ and q C;Hð Þ. Now consider Case (a) as above. In this case,
the marginal criminal type ~B changes but the equilibrium is Regime 1 both for
eL ¼ e0L as well as for eL ¼ e1L. Note that an increase in eL leads to an increase of
both q C;Hð Þ and q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þð Þ, and consequently, the dynamic deterrence
effect increases. Consequently, ~B increases and the incentive to commit crime
goes down unambiguously. This is similar to the result obtained in Corollary 1
(but different from Proposition 1). Next, consider (b), that is the case in which
the equilibrium is Regime 3 both for eL ¼ e0L as well as for eL ¼ e1L. In this case,
an increase in eL increases q C;Hð Þ but q I;Hð Þ remains constant. Consequently,
the dynamic deterrence effect goes down and the incentive to commit crime
increases unambiguously.13 This is same as the result obtained in Proposition 1
(and Corollary 1). Finally, consider (c), that is the case in which one shifts from
Regime 1 for eL ¼ e0L to Regime 3 for eL ¼ e1L. In this case, there is an increase in
q C;Hð Þ but the effect on q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þð Þ is ambiguous. Hence, a decrease in
the severity of the recession may shift the incentive to commit crime either way.
This is also same as in Proposition 1 (and Corollary 1). In summary, a decrease in
the severity of a recession can have an ambiguous effect on the incentive to
commit crime, even if firms treat workers with a bad record more harshly.
4.2.3 Impact of an Increase in Optimism
We now consider an increase in optimism about the future, given that there is a
boom in period 1. In our model, an increase in optimism given that s1 ¼ H is








HH . Notice that this leads
13 The easiest way to draw this conclusion is by observing eq. [5].
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HH , because γHH þ γHL ¼ 1. Recall that
the boundary between the regimes is determined by the intersection of 1 λ ~B 
and eL. Hence, there cannot be any regime change in this case because an
increase in γHH does not shift the boundary. Therefore, we consider two cases
in which the marginal criminal type lies to the (a) right of the boundary in
Regime 1 or (b) to the left of the boundary in Regime 3.
First, consider the case in which the marginal criminal type lies in Regime 1.
To analyze this case, note that eL
1λ ~Bð Þ < 1 in Regime 1. Hence, an increase in γHH
and a corresponding decrease in γHL leads to an increase in q C;Hð Þ and this
increases the incentive to commit crime. Further, q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þ is given by
γHLp
eL
1λ ~Bð Þ and this decreases because of the reduction in γHL. Note that the latter
effect also works in the same direction. Hence, an increase in γHH increases
crime by reducing dynamic deterrence.
Next, consider the case in which the marginal criminal type lies in Regime 3.
In this case, an increase in γHH and a corresponding decrease in γHL leads to an
increase in q C;Hð Þ and this increases the incentive to commit crime. It can also
be checked that q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þ goes down as well and this also reinforces the
incentive to commit crime. Hence, in this case also, an increase in γHH increases
crime by reducing dynamic deterrence.
We summarize these findings below.
Proposition 2 Suppose there is a boom in period 1. An increase in optimism leads
to an increase in crime.










The above inequality means that an increase in optimism about the future benefits
workers who commit a crime more than workers who choose to remain innocent.
As long as eq. [8] holds, Proposition 2 will continue to hold. However, the result
can be overturned if that is not the case. To examine this issue, it is instructive to
consider a slightly altered model than the one considered in the paper. In this
altered model, assume that if there is a boom in period 2, then workers with a
good record still find employment in period 2 with probability 1 but those with a
bad record are employed in period 2 with probability f ~B
 
; f ð Þ  1.
Suppose the marginal criminal type lies in Regime 1. Then,
q C;Hð Þ ¼ γHH 1 pð Þ þ pf ~B
  þ γHL 1 pð Þ eL1 λ ~B 
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and
q I;Hð Þ ¼ γHH þ γHL
eL
1 λ ~B  :
Therefore,
q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þ ¼ γHHp 1 f ~B
  þ γHLp eL1 λ ~B  :
It then follows that
@q C;Hð Þ
@γHH
¼ pf ~B þ 1 pð Þ 1 eL






 @q C;Hð Þ
@γHH
¼ p 1 f ~B  eL
1 λ ~B 
" #
: ½10
It follows from eq. [9] that @q C;Hð Þ@γHH >0. However, the expression in eq. [10] has an
indeterminate sign. If f ~B
 
is close enough to 1, then eq. [10] is negative and eq. [8]
is satisfied. Consequently Proposition 2 continues to hold. However, if f ~B
 
is
sufficiently smaller than 1, then eq. [10] can be positive. In this case [8] is violated
and the effect of an increase in optimism on the incentive to commit crime can go
either way. A similar conclusion holds if themarginal criminal type lies in Regime 3.
4.3 Equilibrium if There is a Recession in Period 1
Suppose there is a recession in period 1. As before, let the marginal criminal type
be ~B. If a worker has the private benefit of ~B, then she is indifferent between
committing a crime and remaining innocent. Therefore, the following inequality
must hold for an employed worker with type ~B:
~B ¼ΔL ~B; ~B
 
; τ þ pf
þ q I; Lð ÞV2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ  q C; Lð ÞV2 A1 ¼ Cð Þ:
½11
As before for ~B to be the marginal criminal it must be that:
~B ΔL ~B; ~B
  ¼ 0:
In eq. [11], the term
θL ~B
 
; q I; Lð ÞV2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ  q C; Lð ÞV2 A1 ¼ Cð Þ ½12
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is the dynamic deterrence effect. We determine the impact of a reduction in the
severity of a recession on the dynamic deterrence effect. To do so, we manip-
ulate the expression in eq. [12] and obtain the following decomposition:
θL ~B
  ¼ q I; Lð Þ  q C; Lð Þf gV2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ
 q C; Lð Þ V2 A1 ¼ Cð Þ  V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þf g:
Notice that the terms q C; Lð Þ, q I; Lð Þ  q C; Lð Þ, V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ and
V2 A1 ¼ Cð Þ  V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ
are all non-negative.
4.3.1 Impact of a Decrease in the Severity of a Recession
We now consider the impact of a decrease in the severity of a recession. As
before, this is captured by an increase in the labor demand during a recession eL






L. As discussed immediately after eq. [3], the boundary
between the regimes is determined by the intersection of 1 λ ~B  and 2 1eL.
Therefore, if eL goes up from e0L to e
1
L, the boundary shifts to the right. Pick a
value of ~B and notice that any of three possible outcomes can occur because of
the rightward shift of the boundary between Regime 2 and Regime 3: The
candidate value of the marginal criminal type ~B lies (a) to the right of the
boundary (in Regime 2) both for eL ¼ e0L as well as for eL ¼ e1L, (b) to the left
of the boundary (in Regime 3) both for eL ¼ e0L as well as for eL ¼ e1L, and (c) to
the right of the boundary (in Regime 2) for eL ¼ e0L and to the left of the
boundary (in Regime 3) for eL ¼ e1L. Observe that an increase in eL leads to a
regime change only for the third case. Below, we consider how ΔL B; ~B
 
changes
in response to an increase in eL.
First consider (a). In this case, the equilibrium belongs to Regime 2 both for
eL ¼ e0L as well as for eL ¼ e1L. In Regime 2, an increase in eL has no impact on
either q C; Lð Þ or on q I; Lð Þ. Hence, if the marginal criminal type belongs to
Regime 2, then an increase in eL has no impact on ΔL B; ~B
 
and hence, there
is no change in the equilibrium level of the marginal criminal type.
Consequently, in this case, a decrease in the severity of a recession has no
impact on crime.
We now consider (b), that is the case in which we are in Regime 3 both for
eL ¼ e0L as well as for eL ¼ e1L. In this case, an increase in eL increases q C; Lð Þ but
has no impact on q I; Lð Þ. As discussed above, a decrease in q I; Lð Þ  q C; Lð Þ
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decreases the incentive to remain innocent in period 1. Further, an increase in
q C; Lð Þ reinforces the same effect. Hence, dynamic deterrence decreases and this
decreases ΔL B; ~B
 
. Consequently, the equilibrium level of the marginal criminal
type goes down unambiguously, that is, crime (adjusted for employment level)
increases.
Finally, we consider (c), that is the case in which the equilibrium is in
Regime 2 for eL ¼ e0L and shifts to Regime 3 for eL ¼ e1L. This implies that when
eL increases from e0L to e
1









Observe from Figure 3 that since e1L belongs to Regime 3, therefore,
2 1eL > 1 λ ~B
  
, from which it follows that 1e
1
L
λ ~Bð Þe1L < 1. This implies that
q I; Lð Þ  q C; Lð Þ decreases when eL increases from e0L to e1L and this decreases








and this reinforces the same effect. Therefore, when eL increases from e0L to e
1
L,
then dynamic deterrence decreases and this decreases ΔL B; ~B
 
. Consequently,
the marginal criminal type i.e. ~B goes down unambiguously. To summarize, if e0L
belongs to Regime 2 and e1L belongs to Regime 3, then a reduction in the severity
of the recession increases crime (adjusted for employment level).
We summarize the analysis with the following proposition
Proposition 3 Suppose there is a recession in period 1. (a) If the equilibrium
belongs to regime 2 both before and after an increase in eL, then there is no impact
on crime. (b) If the equilibrium belongs to regime 3 both before and after a change
in eL, then an increase in eL increases crime (adjusted for the level of employment
in period 1). (c) If the equilibrium belongs to regime 2 to begin with and after a
change in eL it moves to regime 3, then an increase in eL increases crime (adjusted
for the level of employment in period 1).
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4.3.2 Impact of an Increase in Optimism
We now consider an increase in optimism about the future, given that there is a
recession in period 1. In our model, an increase in optimism given that s1 ¼ L is








LH . Notice that this leads to








LH , because γLH þ γLL ¼ 1. Recall that the
boundary between the regimes is determined by the intersection of 1 λ ~B  and
2 1eL. Hence, there cannot be any regime change in this case because an
increase in γLH does not shift the boundary. Therefore, we consider two cases
in which the marginal criminal type lies to the (a) right of the boundary in
Regime 2 or (b) to the left of the boundary in Regime 3.
First, consider the case in which the marginal criminal type lies in Regime 2.
In this case, a decrease in γLL leads to an increase in q C; Lð Þ and this increases
the incentive to commit crime. Further, q I; Lð Þ  q C; Lð Þ is given by γLLp and this
decreases. Note that the latter effect also works in the same direction. Hence, an
increase in γLH increases crime by reducing dynamic deterrence.
Next, consider the case in which the marginal criminal type lies in Regime 3.
In this case, a decrease in γLL leads to an increase in q C; Lð Þ and this increases
the incentive to commit crime. It can also be checked that q I; Lð Þ  q C; Lð Þ goes
down as well and this also reinforces the incentive to commit crime. Hence, in
this case also, an increase in γLH increases crime by reducing dynamic
deterrence.
We summarize these findings below.
Proposition 4 Suppose there is a recession in period 1. An increase in optimism
leads to an increase in crime.
As in Proposition 2, one can see that the key reason why Proposition 4 holds
is that in our model,
@q C; Lð Þ
@γLH
> max






The above inequality means that an increase in optimism about the future
benefits workers who commit a crime more than workers who choose to remain
innocent. As long as eq. [13] holds, Proposition 4 will continue to hold. However,
the result can be overturned if that is not the case. In order to show this,
consider the altered model described after Proposition 2. In that altered model,
it is assumed that if there is a boom in period 2, then workers with a good record
still find employment in period 2 with probability 1 but those with a bad record
are employed in period 2 with probability f ~B
 
; f ð Þ  1.
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Suppose the marginal criminal type lies in Regime 3. Then, it can be shown
that
@q C; Lð Þ
@γLH








@q I; Lð Þ
@γLH
¼ 0:




enough to 1, then eq. [14] is positive and therefore eq. [13] is satisfied.
Consequently, Proposition 4 holds. However, if f ~B
 
is sufficiently smaller
than 1, then eq. [14] is negative. In this case eq. [13] is violated and an increase
in optimism decreases the incentive to commit crime. Hence, the crime rate
goes down in this case. It can also be shown that if the marginal criminal type
lies in Regime 2, then Proposition 4 continues to hold even with the altered
model.
5 Robustness Checks: Endogenizing
the Employment Decision
In the discussion above, the decision making process of the firms were not
explicitly modeled. In this section, we therefore endogenize the employment
decision of the firms and consider its impact on the main results of the paper.
Consider a perfectly competitive industry with a large number of identical
firms. For this industry, the (inverse) demand curve is
p ¼ α q
and the supply curve is
p ¼ β þ q:
Hence, in equilibrium, the price and aggregate quantity are
p ¼ 1
2
α βð Þ and q ¼ 1
2
αþ βð Þ:
The parameter α varies according to the state of the economy. In particular, it
takes a value of αH during a boom and αL during a recession; αH > αL. Each
worker produces one unit of output.
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In each period, the aggregate employment depends on the state of the
economy in that period and the record of the workers. Consider period 1. The
gross value of marginal product (excluding deviance costs) of each worker is
1
2
αs1  βð Þ
where s1 is the state in period 1. In this period, all workers are identical since
none of them have any record. However, the firms can anticipate that the
probability that a worker will engage in deviant behavior in period 1 is λ ~B
 
.
Suppose a firm incurs a loss of m for each instance of deviance. Then, the net
value of marginal product of a worker in period 1 is
1
2
αs1  βð Þ  λ ~B
 
m:
The net value of marginal product curve is depicted by the horizontal lines in
Figure 4. The supply curve of labor is determined by a function w eð Þ where e is
the level of employment. The labor supply curve is determined by the labor
leisure choice of individual workers; w
0
eð Þ>0.
The employment in the economy is determined by the intersection of the net
marginal product curve and the labor supply curve. We assume that
αH  β þ 2 mþ w 1ð Þð Þ: ½15
This ensures that everyone (including those with a bad record) is employed if
there is a boom in period 1, that is,
e1 H; ~B
  ¼ 1:
If there is a recession in period 1, then it follows from Figure 4 that some workers
are unemployed and the rate of employment depends positively on ~B, that is
Figure 4: The net value of
marginal product of a firm
is given by the horizontal
line whose height depends
on the state of the econ-
omy. The supply curve of
labor is given by w(e).








Let w1 s1; ~B
 
denote the wage rate in period 1 if the state is s1 and the marginal





that is, in period 1, the wage rate decreases with the incentive to commit crime.
This is different from the previous model with exogenous firms because that
model assumes that the wage rate depends on the state of the economy but not
the crime rate.
Now consider period 2. The net value of marginal product in period 2 is a step
function. This function attains its highest value for experienced workers with a
good record, followed by inexperienced workers, followed by experienced work-
ers with a bad record. The wage rate is determined by the intersection of the wage
schedule with the net value of marginal product schedule. As long as eq. [15]
holds, it can be shown that everyone will be employed if there is a boom in













In period 2, the employment rate in a recession as well as the wage rate depends
on the marginal criminal types in both periods. However, the marginal criminal
type in period 2 will have no role to play in the analysis, therefore, we suppress
it. In this model, the wage rates in the two periods can be different, even for the
same state. This model will also require a modification of Figure 2 because
e2 L; ~B
 
is now an increasing function of ~B, instead of being a constant function.
However, there are still two regimes (for each initial state). A decrease in the
severity of a recession in this model is captured by an increase in αL and we
show below that in this model, such a change has similar effects as in
Propositions 1 and 3.
Suppose there is a boom in period 1. In this model, the dynamic deterrence
effect is still given by a similar expression as eq. [6] with the differences being as
follows: (i) In the expressions for V2 ð Þ, we replace wL with w2 L; ~B
 
, and (ii) in
the expressions for q C;Hð Þ and q I;Hð Þ, we replace eL with e2 L; ~B
 
.
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First, consider the case in which the equilibrium is Regime 1 before and after
the increase in αL. An increase in αL increases e2 L; ~B
 
and w2 L; ~B
 
. These
changes in turn increase q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þð Þ, q C;Hð Þ, and V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ but leaves
V2 A1 ¼ Cð Þ  V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þð Þ½  unchanged. Hence, it follows that both terms of the
dynamic deterrence effect eq. [6] increase. Consequently, the net effect of an
increase in αL can go either way. This result is same as in Proposition 1.
Next, consider the case in which the equilibrium is Regime 3 before and
after the increase in αL. An increase in αL decreases q I;Hð Þ  q C;Hð Þð Þ, increase
q C;Hð Þ and V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þ but leaves V2 A1 ¼ Cð Þ  V2 A1 ¼ Ið Þð Þ½  unchanged.
Hence, it follows that second term of the dynamic deterrence effect eq. [6]
increases, while the first term can go either way. Consequently, the net effect
of an increase in αL in this case can go either way. This result differs from
Proposition 1 but it is consistent with the central idea of the paper that a
decrease in the severity of a recession can cause the incentive to commit crime
go either way.
One can similarly derive the effect of an increase in αL when there is a
regime change.
6 Extensions and Concluding Remarks
We have presented an intertemporal model of workplace deviance or on-the-job
criminal behavior to analyze the way this varies with the state of the economy.
There is a dearth of theoretical work in this area which tries to model workplace
deviant behavior in relation to the state of the economy. Even the empirical
literature is limited in this area and the little information that we have via
managerial interviews (as mentioned in Section 1) has contradictory findings
with some suggesting shirking increases in a recession while others believe that
it decreases. This paper fills a void in the literature by modeling this phenom-
enon and finds that the relationship is ambiguous and whether deviant behavior
goes up or down in a recession depends on the strength of competing effects.
It is plausible that deviant behavior in the workplace affects labor produc-
tivity. One example of deviant behavior is shirking. If there is an increase in
shirking, then this decreases the average productivity of workers. Similarly,
other kinds of deviant behavior such as bullying is not conducive for a produc-
tive working environment. This paper demonstrates that the decision to be
deviant which affects productivity of workers depends non-monotonically on
the state of the economy. Our results are robust to endogenous hiring choice by
firms.
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A number of assumptions were made in the model. We briefly discuss the
implications of relaxing them for our results. First, we assume that the convic-
tion probability is exogenous. Let us consider very briefly the effect of endogen-
izing the variable. One can conjecture that an employer is likely to expend more
resources on monitoring when the equilibrium crime rate is high (that is when ~B
is low) and vice-versa. Thus, it must be the case that p
0 ~B
 
< 0. By definition, the





1 G ~B  
and this term will still be negatively related with ~B although the absolute value
of the slope will be greater when we allow for an endogenous p ~B
 
. In terms of
Figure 2, this means that the size of Regime 3 will shrink. However, there will
still be two regimes and we will still obtain the result that an increase in the
severity of a recession need not lead to an increase in workplace deviance.
Further, we assume that the penalty for crime takes the form of a fine. In
reality, the punishment could also be in the form of imprisonment that renders
the convict inactive next period. This would imply that the attractiveness of
crime would go down if there is a decrease in the severity of the recession (or
equivalently, an increase in eL). However, that does not substantially change the
incentives in comparison with a fine of equivalent disutility. As before, it
depends on the regime. If one is in regime 1 or 2, then an increase in eL which
does not change the regime makes no difference to the marginal criminal as they
remain unemployed if caught. So there is no additional disincentive from being
in prison (and hence being inactive in the labor market). The incentive for the
marginal case would change if one is in regime 3 in which case some people
with bad records are hired. In such a case, the attractiveness of employment in
terms of an increase in eL decreases crime. Of course, if imprisonment of
criminals causes a labor deficit, wages would rise which would in turn increase
the value to being innocent.
It is worth noting that though we look at on-the-job crime, the channel via
which people without a criminal record face different probabilities of employ-
ment affect other types of crime including that committed by unemployed
people. Unemployed people also face a choice similar to the worker in our
model, when facing a crime opportunity B he has to consider not just the “static”
effect of being caught today but the decreased probability this will have on his
employment in the future. Again, in a recession employers can be more choosy
and thus anticipation of recession may cause dynamic deterrence to increase for
the unemployed similar to the employed worker. Indeed, there is suggestive
evidence that crime in general may have fallen during the current recession. For
instance, an article in the Guardian (Travis 2010) reports that crime has reduced
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in the UK in recent years in spite of the recession although it was widely feared
that it would go up. Dynamic deterrence may be one possible explanation of this
phenomenon. One can thus look at how unemployed people face different
probabilities of employment in different regimes and show changes that affect
the incentive to commit crime when eL changes. While we model the decision
making of perfectly competitive firms (who face productivity losses from deviant
behavior) in Section 5, one can also look at how incentives in terms of penalties
and dismissal should optimally vary across the business cycle to find out if, for
example, a “firing policy” conditional on crime in period 1 induces higher profits
by lowering deviant behavior and how such policy changes across the business
cycle.14 Thus, we can formally model how the optimal personnel decisions of
firms should vary with market conditions.15 Finally, as the severity of recession
determines the relationship between crime and the state of the economy one can
look at sectors which are more or less affected by recession and use data on
some measure of shirking (such as sickness absence) or workplace deviance
(perhaps measured by employee theft) to test our hypotheses about how these
vary with the business cycle. It should be noted that contradictory findings from
empirical studies across different time periods should not surprise us as our
model predicts that the relationship may go either way and depends on the
relative severity of the recession.
Finally, future work can consider how the “state of the economy” i.e. how
severe the recession is coupled with firm specific shocks (e.g. two otherwise
identical firms end up with higher or lower number of deviant types) can explain
the entry and exit process of firms. Several papers analyze this process with
regards to firm specific productivity shocks (e.g. Jovanovic 1982; Hopenhayn
1992). Interaction with the state of the economy may offer more insights into
when entry and exit of firms occur with regards to demand conditions. This is
left for future research.
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14 See Dickens et al. (1989) for work on optimal monitoring and penalty to deter on the job
crime, though not in the context of business cycles.
15 A similar issue arises when we consider the issue of recidivism and rehabilitation. There is
interesting research on the impact of human capital development of prisoners to improve their
(post-release) labor market opportunities but, which consequently, affects the deterrent effect
(see for example, Imai and Krishna 2004).
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